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Abstract 
In a two-country general equilibrium Ricardian model, we propose a model in which countries compete 
in the same sectors via exports or FDI.  Factor endowments are important in that they affect relative 
wages and the range of goods countries produce.  Effects of factor endowments on FDI depend on the 
interaction of FDI and trade barriers.  Transportation costs do favor FDI at the expense of exports, but 
reduce trade and investment.  Finally, in contrast to the new trade theory, across industries, it is the 
relatively less productive firms that engage in FDI while the relatively more productive firms export. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A question central to international economics is why do some firms produce only for the home market, 
other firms produce at home for both the home and foreign market, and still other firms produce at home 
for the home market and abroad for the foreign market?  Numerous answers to this question have been 
suggested. They range from firm level heterogeneities (e.g. Helpman, et al., 2004), to incomplete 
contracts (e.g. Helpman & Krugman, 1985; Antrás, 2005), to factor endowments (Cole & Elliott, 2005; 
Gopinath & Chen, 2003), to trade barriers (e.g. Nicoletti et al., 2003; Raff & Srinivasan, 1998), to scale 
economies (e.g. Brainard, 1993; Horstmann & Markusen, 1992).  Markusen (1995) provides a thorough 
examination of the evidence in the context of a set of macro and microeconomic facts of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) that have not been fully explained in the theoretical literature. Among these, at the 
macro level, are that most FDI is from one developed country to another, FDI flows are two-way 
between pairs of developed countries, most FDI is horizontal so that FDI and exports are substitutes, and 
factor endowments and trade barriers are not the main determinants of FDI flows.  At the micro level, 
multinationals tend to be firms for which intangible, firm-specific assets, such as proprietary knowledge, 
are important.  Further, FDI increases relative to trade as trade barriers increase, but both trade and 
investment are reduced.   
In this paper we develop a model that is motivated both by the existing theoretical literature and 
by Markusen’s stylized facts.  We develop a general, rather than partial, equilibrium Ricardian model, 
based on Dornbusch et al. (1977), in which there exists a continuum of industrial sectors each populated 
by a continuum of potential firms rather than a single sector with a continuum of firms.  Firms have 
access to technologies, which are specific to the firm’s country of origin, in their sector.  Thus, in 
contrast to Helpman, et al. (2004), there are no differences in within country – within sector productivity 
(all domestic firms operating in a sector, whether at home or abroad, are identical), rather productivity 
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differences are across countries and across sectors, both within and across countries.   Markets are 
competitive rather than monopolistically competitive.  Our general equilibrium approach emphasizes the 
importance of intersectoral, country specific, rather than interfirm, differences in technology as a 
motivation for trade.   Specifically we assume that there are two countries, A and B, and a continuum of 
industrial sectors.  Consumers in both countries have identical, Cobb-Douglas preferences.  Firms in 
each of the industrial sectors of both countries have access to technologies to produce in their sector, 
either at home or abroad.  Labor is the only productive input.  Home production requires only domestic 
labor.  Foreign production (FDI) requires both domestic and foreign labor, where the domestic labor can 
be interpreted as the (embodied) intangible assets, the country-specific knowledge, that gives the firm its 
productive edge.  This assumption on firm/country specificity of FDI production technology is 
consistent with Cheng et al. (2005) and Lipsey (2002) as well as Markusen (1995).  Firms are 
competitive.  Comparative advantage and the equilibrium distribution of which firms produce what 
goods where is determined by tastes, technology, endowments, and competitive price setting. 
We find that FDI flows from country A to country B, and vice versa.  In their export versus FDI 
decision, firms take into consideration the advantages, such as local labor skills, transport costs and 
tariffs, and country-specific technology advantages, such as ownership advantages, proprietary 
information, patents, and embodied knowledge, of locating in rather than exporting to the host country.  
In equilibrium, Country A firms serve Country B markets in those industries in which Country A has a 
comparative advantage, where Country A’s relatively more efficient industries export while its relatively 
less efficient industries serve the foreign market via FDI.  So, for example, consider the US and suppose 
there are three sectors:  high tech, medium tech and low tech, which can be thought of as sophisticated 
medical technology, automobiles, and clothing.  Assume the US is most productive in high tech sectors, 
so it produces medical technology in the US and it exports that medical technology to its trading 
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partners. Its productive efficiency allows it to absorb the transportation cost of exporting while still 
being able to supply the foreign market at a lower cost than can its potential foreign competitors.  It is 
less productive in the auto industry, so it engages in FDI, taking its expertise abroad while availing of 
the lower foreign wages and avoiding transport costs and tariffs.  Finally, it is least productive in 
clothing, an industry in which it does not produce and instead imports all clothing from its trading 
partners.     
Our results are consistent with results of a variety of theoretical and empirical studies 
underpinned by a wide set of technology and industrial structure assumptions.  For example,  our results 
are consistent with the findings of Head and Ries (2003) in the context of a partial equilibrium, single 
industry, monopoly model.  They are also consistent with recent empirical work. Yeaple (2003) provides 
evidence that the USA outward FDI occurs in those industries in which the USA has comparative 
advantages. Fosfuri and Motta (1999) illustrate how firms invest abroad to capture local advantages 
through geographical proximity (low transport costs). Makino et al. (2004) and Park (2003) provide 
evidence that Japanese FDI in developed countries is undertaken in those industries in which the 
Japanese have ownership (technological) advantage, and Driffield (1999) shows that, in the foreign-
owned sector of the UK manufacturing industry, specific ownership advantage is an important 
component.  Consistent with Head and Ries (2003), FDI is horizontal – it substitutes for exporting, so 
the same (single-product) firm will not both export and produce abroad via FDI.  Factor endowments are 
important in that they affect relative wages, and so the range of goods each country produces.  Effects of 
factor endowments on FDI are ambiguous and depend on the interaction of FDI and trade barriers, such 
as transportation costs and tariffs.  Transportation costs do favor FDI at the expense of exports, but 
reduce both trade and investment.  Finally, in contrast to the findings of the new trade theorists 
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(Helpman, 2006; Helpman et al., 2004), in our model, in a comparison of sectors, it is the relatively less 
productive firms that engage in FDI and the relatively more productive firms that export.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section II the model is developed and results on comparative 
advantage and the range of goods produced in each country are determined.  Section III analyzes the 
general equilibrium. In section IV, comparative static exercises are conducted and the main findings of 
the paper are derived and discussed.  Section V concludes.   
II. THE MODEL  
There are two countries, A and B with populations LA and LB, respectively.  There is a continuum of 
industrial sectors in the world economy distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Markets are competitive. 
Individuals in both countries have identical preferences. Specifically, assume they share the same Cobb-
Douglas tastes for the different types of goods produced in the different industries:  
  1
0
 loglog dzzMU , 
where  is a constant representing the expenditure share on industry z’s manufactured goods and  zM  
represents the consumption of good z. The individual is subject to the budget constraint  
    1
0
dzzMzPY , 
where P(z) is the price of good z. This yields the familiar result that 
   zP
YzM            (1) 
and so we can define the economy’s price index as 
  1
0
 loglog dzzPP , 
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Producers 
Assume that there is a continuum of sector specific firms in countries A and B each of which has access 
to technologies to produce in their industrial sector.  Technologies are specific to sector, country of 
origin, and country in which production takes place.  Labor is the only input, but the labor skills 
available to country A producers differ from those available to country B producers.  In other words, for 
every particular industry z, say automobiles, all country A’ firms in industry z share the same technology 
if they produce locally. The same assumption applies to country B’s firms. However, technology 
available in industry z in country A is not necessarily the same as that in country B.  Firms participating 
in industry z are competitive.  Hence, the most competitive remain in the market and all others exit.  If 
we consider industry z’, other firms engage are competitive as well, and so on.    
Assume that producers’ technology is constant returns to scale, and hence their production 
function is linear. Therefore, let  denote the unit effective labor input requirement for a firm in 
country A to produce goods in industry z. Similarly, let 
 za
 zb  be the unit effective labor input 
requirement for a country B firm.  In each country, there is a continuum of firms that can potentially 
serve either market.  That is, a country A firm can produce in sector z at home using the country A 
technology, but it cannot produce at home or abroad using the country B technology. If it produces 
abroad, the technology it uses is specific to country A sector z firms producing in country B and requires 
both country A and country B labor inputs. When a firm undertakes FDI, managerial skills, patents, 
inputs and technology represent an important share of the investment that is paid at home country price 
levels (see Cheng et al., 2005).1  
Prices 
                                                 
1 In fact, Markusen et al. (2000), using data from UNCTAD, show that some home services, namely managerial services, 
engineering services, financial services, marketing and informational services, play an important role in FDI. They estimate 
that services could be up to 60% of a country’s GDP, and when a firm conducts FDI both local labor and services are 
included in the total cost.  
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Consider a country A firm in industrial sector z and consider the decision of serving the domestic market 
and operating locally.  Let WA and WB denote the wage in countries A and B respectively. In this case, 
the firm’s operating profits will be AD  PADQAD WA a z QAD
ai
, where  denotes the output supplied 
to country A and produced in country A, P
QAD
z
AD denotes price and WA denotes the wage paid to country A’s 
workers. Equilibrium requires supply and demand of every good z to be equal. Since country A 
population is LA, using the individual’s demand (1) we obt n QAD WA LA /PAD z . Plugging this 
term into AD, and considering that competition drives profits down to zero, so AD = 0 and rearranging 
we have  
    AAD WzazP  .          (2) 
Domestic firms, however, may face competition from country B’s firms, either because they decide to 
export the goods they produce to country A, or because they set up a subsidiary in country A. If a 
country B firm decides to compete through exports, it must ship goods to country A at a melting-iceberg 
transport cost T > 1.  That is, for each unit of any good dispatched from one country to the other, only a 
fraction 1/T of the original unit actually arrives; the rest evaporates in transit. The firm’s profit is 
AX  PAX QAXT WBb z QAX , where the subscript “AX” means that country A is served through exports. 
Considering that QAX  WAPAX z LA  and that competition drives profits to zero, so AX  0, and 
rearranging, we have that country B firms can lower the price to 
    TWzbzP AAX  .          (3) 
If instead, it decides to serve country A by setting up a subsidiary, that is, through foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the firm can use its own technology to produce in country A. However, differences 
between the two countries result in a cost function that incorporates features of both countries. On the 
one hand, it uses the labor skills, non-traded services and infrastructure available in country A, which are 
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paid at local wage levels. On the other hand, it uses country B management, patents, and supervisors that 
receive country B wages. Therefore, we may assume that the cost function2 of a country B firm 
undertaking FDI in country A can be written as C QAI  a z 1b z WA1WBQAI , where the subscript 
“AI” means that country A is served through FDI. This is a standard Cobb-Douglas cost function that say 
that firms, when they undertake FDI, use both local and foreign technology, with both technologies 
weighted by the parameter . If  is high, the firm is producing at a unit cost close to home production 
and its main benefits are savings in transport cost. Yet if  is low, the firm’s goods will be produced at 
efficiency levels close to those of country A.  The operating profit for a country B firm that undertakes 
FDI in country A is therefore,  
AI  PAI QAI C QAI  
Considering that QAI WA LAPAI
, substituting C XAI  into AI , and considering that competition drives 
profits to zero and rearranging, we have that FDI firms can lower their price to 
       BAAI WWzbzazP 11 .        (4) 
In order to facilitate the analysis, from now on we make several simplifying assumptions. First, since we 
are free to choose units of output in pounds, kilos, etc, we choose the appropriate unit of measurement 
for every good z to make . This way b(z) represents not only the unit effective labor input 
requirement for a country B firm but also its unit labor requirement relative to country A. Second, we 
choose country A units of labor as numeraire, that is, we make 
  1za
1AW . Third, we measure population in 
units of country A population size, LA = 1, and let L denote country B population relative to country A 
population, . Fourth, no restriction is imposed by sorting industries in such a way that AB LLL /
                                                 
2 The interpretation that we gives to the cost function is broader than in Cheng et al. (2005), as we include in the home 
component all kinds of services not only management services. Also, our cost function is Cobb-Douglas while theirs is linear. 
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  0' zb
P
, and fifth, no interesting insight is lost if we make  = 1. Also, we denote  so we 
can rewrite functions (2), (3) and (4) as 
AB WW /
  1zAD ,   and     TzbzPAX       zbzPAI .   (5) 
Who Serves The Market? 
What firms serve market z? Since the market structure is competitive, market z will be served by those 
firms offering the lowest price. First, consider Figure 1. Let  denote the unit effective labor input 
requirement for which competition forces both export and FDI prices to be equal for a country B firm. 
Let  and  denote their associated price and industry respectively, that is, 
*
Ab
*
AP
*
Az PA
*  bA*PAX bA*  PAI  , 
and bA
*  b z A* . In that industry, country B firms are indifferent between exporting to country A or 
setting up a subsidiary firm there. Hence, country B firms are in a better position to compete in country 
A markets through exports in the relatively more productive industries 0,bA
*  and through FDI in 
industries . The reason is that, when b(z) is low, country B firms are relatively more efficient in 
industry z. Since FDI requires the mixing of foreign and local skills and technology, country B firms will 
be able to produce at a lower cost at home than abroad. Therefore, country B firms are in a better 
position to compete through exports in those industries in which they are relatively more efficient. That 
advantage, however, is partially offset as transportation cost increases, and therefore, that advantage 
eventually disappears for the relatively less efficient industries, which consequently prefer to set up 
subsidiaries to save in transportation costs or to produce only for the home market.  
bA
* ,1 
Let us extend the analysis to include domestic firms. As Figure 2 shows, there are two possible 
equilibria. Figure 3 considers the case in which . In this case, foreign firms will be able to 
compete with domestic firms only through exports, as domestic firms are relatively efficient and thus 
1* AP
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foreign firms are able to compete only through exports. Figure 4 considers the case in which , that 
is, foreign firms are relatively efficient. In that case, country A firms produce domestically in those 
industries in which they are most efficient, , and country B exports in their most efficient 
industries 
1* AP
**bb 
b  0,b* . However, there is a range of industries b*,b**  in which the relative advantage of 
country B firms over country A firms is not high enough and so they set up subsidiaries in country A in 
order to save in transport costs and be in better position to compete by offering lower prices. This result 
differs from Helpman et al. (2004) which claim that only the most productive firms undertake FDI. The 
difference is due to Helpman et al.’s (2004) partial equilibrium analysis which, consider only one 
industry with a continuum of firms that differ in technology instead of a continuum of industries. 
Let us inquire a bit more into those industries in which domestic firms are more competitive. If 
, foreign firms compete only through exports (Figure 2), and that occurs when 1* AP    zzPAD PAX  if 
. Suppose now that  (Figure 3), then Country A firms and country B firms undertaking 
FDI set the same price in industry z
 z
 bzb/1
   1/1 Tzb a
Tb/1 1* AP
b, PAD =  PAI, if 
  
On the other hand, a country B firm is indifferent between exporting and undertaking FDI, PAX =  PAI, if 
  1/ .          (6) 
Therefore, domestic firms can bid a lower price than foreign firms, whether they export or undertake 
FDI, for those industries z such that z > zb, that is, in those industries in which it has a comparative 
advantage. For those industries, domestic firms serve the country A market. Likewise, foreign firms 
serve country A markets for those industries such that z < zb. Nevertheless, they prefer to serve the 
market through FDI for those industries such that za < z < zb, and through exports for those industries 
such that z < za.  
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Repeating the exercise, prices for country B, we have 
    zbzPBD   and   TzPBX        11zbzPBI .    (7) 
Figures 5 and 6 show that similar results can be obtained for markets in country B. It is straightforward 
to obtain that, when firms undertake FDI, domestic firms will serve those markets in which z < zb. 
Foreign firms serve through FDI those markets in which, zb < z < zc, and through exports those markets 
in which zc < z < 1. That means that each country will be serving both countries in those industries in 
which it has comparative advantages. We also have that zc is characterized by 
   czbT /1/1  . 
Therefore, country B firms can set lower prices than foreign firms in the domestic market for industries z 
such that z < zb, and country A firms are more competitive serving the foreign market through exports 
instead of FDI for industries z > zd. The previous discussion, summarized in Figure 1, leads to the 
following 
LEMMA 1: Let the wage ratio  be given.  Assume that both countries’ technologies are advanced 
enough so they can undertake FDI. 
(i) Country A has comparative advantages in industries [zb, 1] and country B has comparative 
advantages in industries [0, zb].  
(ii) Firms serve both local and foreign markets in those industries in which their country has a 
comparative advantage.  
(iii) Firms serve the foreign market through exports in those industries in which their efficiency 
is the highest, relative to foreign country firms, and serves it through FDI in those 
industries in which its efficiency is relatively low. 
Lemma 1 states that each country produces in those industries in which it has a comparative advantage, 
and their firms undertake FDI only in those industries in which they already have a comparative 
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advantage. Therefore, country A firms serve both countries in industries within the interval [zb, 1], and 
country B firms serve both countries in industries in the interval [0, zb]. In other words if, for example, 
the USA has a comparative advantage in software and Japan in domestic electronics (stereos, TVs, etc), 
the USA will serve both markets in software and Japan both markets in domestic electronics, but the 
USA firms will not undertake FDI in domestic electronics.  
When  is high (close to one), firms undertake foreign direct investment using technologies 
similar to host country firms.  Country A firms only undertake FDI in those industries in the interval [zb, 
zc], and country B firms in those industries within the interval [za, zb].  This means they would be 
undertaking FDI only in those industries in which they have comparative advantages but in the absence 
of FDI would be non-traded industries because of the high transport costs. Since we can expect, in 
general, that  will be in the interval [0, 1], firms undertake FDI not only in those industries that 
otherwise would be non-traded but also in those that cluster around their marginal industries. 
The decision about serving a foreign market through FDI or exports is based on their relative 
efficiency. The more efficient an industry is, the lower the price it can set to compete with other firms. 
Therefore, country A firms will serve country B markets through exports in industries [zc, 1] and through 
FDI in industries [zb, zc]. The reason is that highly efficient firms can lower prices substantially and thus 
prefer to serve the foreign market by producing locally and paying transport costs. If efficiency is not 
that high, then firms prefer to save on transport costs and, thus, they can do better by setting up a 
subsidiary in the foreign country. This result is consistent with Head and Ries (2003) but differs from 
Helpman et al (2004) which claim that only the most productive firms undertake FDI. The difference is 
due to Helpman et al’s (2004) partial equilibrium analysis in which, instead of competitive markets, they 
consider a monopolistically competitive model that concentrates on within sector differences in firm 
technologies while ignoring differences in technology between countries.  
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The Wage Equation 
In equilibrium, demand and supply of labor must be equal. Since we are interested in analyzing the FDI 
vs. exports decision, consider the case in which both countries undertake FDI. Therefore, in country A, 
the supply of labor LA must equal the summation of the labor demand of all domestic firms in all 
industries, plus the demand for country A workers of FDI firms in both countries, A and B, that is, 
    BBcAAaAA LWzLWzLW  11 . 
Dividing by WA and remembering that  and  WB /WA LA 1 by assumption, and rearranging, we have 
. Since  and L  za / 1 zc    AIaAX PzP   az    cBX zz BIc PP  , from (5) and (7) we have that 
 and , so b za T  b za  T  b zc 11 za  za ,T  and  zc  zc ,T . Therefore,  
  DLB ,          (8) 
where D   za ,T 
1 zc ,T  .  Equation (8) determines the wage ratio, , and closes the system. A concern 
that remains is the existence of equilibrium.   0' D  is a sufficient condition to guarantee equilibrium. 
The following lemma establishes this.  
LEMMA 2: The function  is negatively sloped.  D
Proof: See Appendix.  
Since, by Lemma 2,  is negatively sloped, an equilibrium always exists.  D
LEMMA 3: An increase in  makes all cutoff points za, zb, zc and zd decrease.  
Proof: See Appendix.  
Lemma 3 states an increase country B wage relative to country A increases country A comparative 
advantages (za decreases) and decreases its imports from country B (zc decreases). Similarly, country B 
comparative advantage is diminished (zb decreases) and the amount of industries served by imports (zd 
decreases) expands. 
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III. EQUILIBRIUM 
From Figures 4 and 6, we have that    aAIaAX zPzP  ,    bAIbAD zPzP   and . From 
(5) and (7), these equations can be rewritten as 
   cBIcBX zPzP 
    /)1/(1Tzb a ,          (9) 
   /1bzb ,           (10) 
    /)1/(1Tzb c .          (11) 
Equations (8)-(11) constitute a system of four equations that determine equilibrium for za, zb, zc and . 
From lemma 3, we know , 0/  az 0/  bz  and 0/  cz . Assuming that  in order to 
guarantee the existence of equilibrium, Figure 7 illustrates equilibrium. The top diagram in the Figure 
determines the equilibrium wage  according to equation (8). Given , equations (8)-(11) represented in 
the left-lower part of the figure determine the technology for the cut-off industries , 
1T
 azbab  bb zbb   
and . Finally, the technology functions in the right-lower part of the figure determine the 
cutoff industries z
 cc zbb 
a, zb and zc.  
IV. COMPARATIVE STATICS 
A firm that produces domestically and at the same time serves the foreign market through exports will 
set higher prices abroad because the transport costs increase the unit cost. On the other hand, those 
industries that serve foreign countries through FDI differ in the weight of the home input and on the 
relative efficiency of their production technology.  That is, a firm that serves the foreign market through 
FDI uses a home labor input, paid at home wages, which may differ from local wages. Yet, equilibrium 
prices depend on a number of parameters. Using (5), (7) and (8) we can obtain a number of important 
results  
LEMMA 4: Suppose there is an increase in the relative size of country B, that is, in LB, then  
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(i) Country A wages increase relative to country B wages. 
(ii) Country B acquires a comparative advantage in industries and country A loses comparative 
advantage. 
(iii) The range of industries served by country A (B) firms decreases (increases). 
(iv) The range of industries served by country A (B) firms through exports decreases 
(increases). 
(v) The effect on the range of industries undertaking FDI in both countries is ambiguous and it 
depends on the technology functions b(z). 
Proof: See Appendix.  
An increase in country B relative labor force results in an excess supply of labor. On the other hand, the 
greater population in country B increases the demand for country A goods, and thus creates an excess 
demand for labor in country A.  Both effects result in lower relative wages in country B. The lower wage 
ratio  makes country B firms able to compete at lower prices, acquiring comparative advantages in 
marginal industries, and thus, an increase in the range of industries that country B firms serve in both 
domestic and foreign markets. Using similar reasoning, country A firms will serve both markets in fewer 
industries.  
The higher population in country B results also in a temporary trade deficit, or equivalently a 
temporary trade surplus in country A, which is offset as country B acquires comparative advantages in 
marginal industries and so increases their exports to country A. Also, country B firms will be able to 
compete and thus control markets in marginal industries that were previously served by country A firms 
through FDI. On the other hand, the lower relative wage in country B makes it profitable to undertake 
FDI projects in industries that previously served the foreign market through exports. 
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Let us inquire now into the effect of transport costs on the general equilibrium. Given the wage 
ratio, , it is apparent from (5) and (6) that an increase in transport costs T makes za decrease and zc 
increase, but has no effect on zb. This means that as transport costs increase, given the wage ratio, , 
international trade diminishes as fewer industries in both countries will be willing to serve foreign 
markets through exports. However, those markets will not be served by domestic firms but still by 
foreign firms through FDI. In other words, FDI activity grows at the expense of exports.  
So far, we have assumed that the wage ratio is given. Yet, as firms switch from exports to FDI, 
labor demand is affected and so are the wage rate and prices in both countries. An increase in the wage 
ratio enhances the effect on country A exports but offsets the effect on country B exports, and vice-versa. 
However, since transport costs affect both countries in the same way, the net effect on the wage ratio is 
ambiguous and it depends on the form of function b(z).  
To analyze the effect of a change in technology, consider Figure 8. The initial equilibrium wage 
is given by 0 and industry, zi for i = a, b or c. A general improvement in technology makes the unit 
effective labor input requirement b(z) for each industry in country B decrease, which makes the curve b 
shift out to b’. The right-lower diagram in Figure 8 illustrates this effect, and the curve bi shifts 
downward for every industry zi. Equations (9)-(11) associate lower input requirement industries with 
higher technology and higher wages (left-lower diagram in Figure 8). Taking derivatives with respect to 
b in (8) we find, 
 
  01
1
2 


c
c
ac
a
z
db
dzzz
db
dz
db
dD  
Since 
db
dza  and 
db
dzc  are positive, this derivative is positive, and the decrease in b causes an upward shift 
in D() in the top diagram in Figure 8, raising salaries in country B. In summary, a technological 
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improvement in country B causes an increase in relative wages in every industry in country B. How is 
trade affected by that? By assumption, the relationship between zi (for i = a, b or c) and b is increasing, 
and lower b is associated with lower zi. Therefore, an improvement in technology will cause zi to 
decrease, for i = a, b or c. Therefore, country B will serve fewer industries overall and country A will 
serve more industries through exports. The effect on the amount of industries served by country A 
through FDI is undefined. The following lemma summarize these results.  
LEMMA 5: Suppose that country B uniformly improves its technological efficiency in every industry 
relative to country A, then 
(i) Country B wages relative to country A wages increases. 
(ii) Country A expands its range of industries in which it has comparative advantage. 
(iii) The range of industries served through imports decreases in country A and increases in 
country B. 
(iv) The range of industries served through FDI changes in an undefined way, each country will 
be serving through FDI those marginal industries in which they are more efficient.  
0
iz
Proof: See Appendix. 
Suppose now that country A levies a uniform tariff on imports at a rate . From equation (5), the price of 
imported goods become 
      1TzbzPAX . 
and (9) becomes 
    1111   Tzb a  
Therefore, a uniform increase in tariff on imports  will make za decrease. In other words, by making 
imported goods more expensive in country B, foreign firms tend to serve country B’s marginal markets 
through FDI instead of exports. In equilibrium, fewer firms serve country B through exports while more 
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serve it through FDI. Notice, however, that neither country acquires a comparative advantage in new 
industries, but simply switches the way they serve the foreign market.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper develops a Ricardian model of trade and investment with a continuum of goods in which 
firms decide whether or not to serve foreign markets, and if they decide to do so, whether to serve it 
through exports or foreign direct investment. The model contributes to the literature in that it approaches 
the issue within a general equilibrium framework in which local and foreign firms compete in 
competitive markets. Results obtained are consistent with some empirical findings in the literature [see, 
for example, Markusen 1995]. Firms serve both markets, local and foreign, only in those industries in 
which they have a comparative advantage. In their investment decision, and among the industries in 
which they have a comparative advantage, firms choose to serve foreign markets through exports in 
those industries in which they are relatively more efficient, and through foreign direct investment in 
those others in which they are relatively less efficient. As in Helpman et al. (2004), this paper concludes 
that, within each sector, the most productive firms engage in FDI. However, it complements Helpman et 
al. (2004)’s approach in that it considers cross country within-sector heterogeneity (although not within 
country, within sector heterogeneity as Helpman does) while focusing on heterogeneity across industries 
within and across countries, which is what makes the paper Ricardian.   
In the comparative static exercise, we find that an increase in country A’s relative size makes its 
relative wage decrease and extends its comparative advantages to a broader range of industries, which 
will be served through FDI. An interesting effect is that of a change in technology. An overall 
improvement in country B’s technological efficiency makes its relative wage increase, but decreases its 
comparative advantages, and shrink the range of industries served through exports. The model clearly 
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illustrates how the industrial organization of international markets affects the structure of international 
trade and firms’ investment decisions in a broader general equilibrium framework. 
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Proof of Lemma 2 and 3:  
Cutoff points za, zb and zc are determined by 
   aAIaAX zPzP  ,    bAIbAD zPzP   and    cBIcBX zPzP  . 
From (5) and (7) these equations can be rewritten as 
(A.1) ,     /)1/(1Tzb a
(A.2)   and    /1bzb
(A.3)      /)1/(1Tzb c
Equilibrium is determined by equations (A.1)-(A.3) and (8), which we rewrite here as 
(A.5)     

c
a
B z
zDL
1
 
It is apparent that the derivatives with respect to  in (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) are all negative,  
(A.6)   02)1/(1 
 Tzb a ,   2
 bzb ,   02)1/(1 
 Tzb a . 
And therefore, since ,    0' zb
0
 az , 0
 cz , and 0
 bz . 
Consider now (8), 
            01
1' 2 

c
caca
z
zzzzD  
That is,  is a decreasing function of .  D
Proof of Lemma 4  
Using (8), we define . From the theorem of the implicit function,    DLLF BB, 




//
/
DLF
LF
L B
B  
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The numerator is clearly negative. On the other hand, from lemma 2, 0/ D  and so the 
denominator is positive. Therefore, . This proves (i). 0/  L
From (4),   01 
 zbPAI . Since  decreases, PAI also decreases and so az  increases. 
This means that country A comparative advantages shrinks. Similarly, country B’s comparative 
advantages are now expanded. We also have that the range of industries served by local firms decrease 
in country A but increases in country B. This proves (ii) and (iii).  
We have that 
B
a
B
a
L
z
dL
dz



 , and  
B
c
B
c
L
z
dL
dz



  
Yet, 
BL
  is negative, and 0
 az , 0
 cz . Therefore, both BL  a BdL  are positive. 
Thus, an increase in country B population, lower its salary and increase the range of industries it serves 
to country A as well as the range of industries it serves through exports.
 nd 
   
a ddz / cdz /
B
ac
B
a
B
c
L
zz
dL
dz
dL
dz






 , 
So the sign is determined by 




 ac zz  yet, this is determined by the shape of b(z. Therefore, the 
differences (zc – zb) and (zb – za) are ambiguous. This proves (iv) and (v). 
Q.E.D. 
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 FIGURE 1 
EXPORTS VS. FDI 
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 FIGURE 2 
CHANGE IN FDI COST 
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 FIGURE 3 
COUNTRY A DECISIONS – NO FDI 
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 FIGURE 4 
COUNTRY A DECISIONS – FDI 
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 FIGURE 5 
COUNTRY B DECISIONS – NO FDI 
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FIGURE 6 
COUNTRY B DECISIONS –FDI 
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FIGURE 7 
EQUILIBRIUM 
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 FIGURE 8 
CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY 
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